Interpretation of the euro-crisis

Now with the interpretation of the euro-crisis two contrary positions are clearly identified. One is that an unit currency like the euro does not work and we would eliminate it again. The others say that the euro without common financial policy does not work and demand “more Europe“ way. A brief view in the history shows: Historically we had installed a unit currency, namely the precious metals. How did one country handled at that time with economic instability? Quite simply: One has required duty fees again. Now the maybe “indecent” proposal: Why do we not save the euro, while we permit the reintroduction of duties fees to the weak states?

The basic problem of the eurozone are the differences in the competitiveness of the countries. One state exports too much and imports not enough, while the other one it has turned back: This leads to suitable slope in the achievement balances, this slope must be financed, so debts accumulate, and this accumulation feels sometimes her borders if not more enough investors are ready to finance this indebtedness. We recognize this fact then as “a euro-debt crisis”. For the solution of the problem one “weak” country has depreciated the currency.
So the imports become more expensive and the exports cheaper, the hole in the achievement balance must not be financed any more what also lowers the need in loans. Today this works only if the local currency exists again. Now instead of this method we try the “real” devaluation: The state saves, wages and social benefits are drastically reduced. This is an immense political strength act which should also lead to the fact that more is exported and less is imported. The question is only how far the population joins in the so affected countries. Who understands if his own salary is shortened?